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Abstract 
This paper examines the organization of death. Through an ethnographic study, we 
examine how a geriatrics department guides the end of life. Drawing on Agamben, we show 
that organizations that are dedicated to life, but regularly confronted with death, develop 
dispositifs (mechanisms, technologies, practices, and relationships) to turn biopolitics (power 
over life) into thanatopolitics (a regime of death). We also show how the inherently political 
meaning of life disrupts such government of death. The inclusion of political life in a regime of 
death disrupts organizational practices that find themselves facing fundamental questions of 
what makes a life worth living, who can decide not to prolong life, and based on which criteria. 
 
Introduction 
‘The defensive attitudes and the embarrassment with which, today, people often react to encounters 
with dying and death fully bear comparison with the reaction of people to overt encounters with 
aspects of sexual life in the Victorian age. As regards sexual life, a limited but noticeable relaxation 
has set in; social and perhaps individual repression is no longer quite so rigid and so massive as it 
used to be. But with regard to dying and death, repression and embarrassment have, if anything, 
increased. Clearly, the resistance to bringing death into the open, into a more relaxed relation to 
dying, is greater than in the case of sexuality.’ (Elias, 1985, pp.43-44) 
The parallel drawn by Norbert Elias between the ‘social repression’ of death in 
contemporary times and sexuality in the Victorian age shows that death remains an awkward 
subject. But as Foucault (1978) stressed in relation to sexuality, there has been a dramatic rise 
in the number of discourses on death, in the media and cultural spheres, but also in science and 
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politics. Although our societies talk endlessly about death and sex, strict conditions for an 
acceptable discourse appear to have become established, with an approved vocabulary and rules 
of decency that must be respected: ‘where and when it was not possible to talk about such things 
became much more strictly defined; in which circumstances, among which speakers, and within 
which social relationships. Areas were thus established, if not of utter silence, at least of tact 
and discretion’ (Foucault, 1978, p.18). And finally, like sex, death has to be managed, regulated, 
and organized: it ‘was in the nature of a public potential; it called for management procedures; 
it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses’ (ibid., p.24).  
This article studies the organization of death. Previous research describes organizations 
dedicated to death (Chwastiak, 2001, 2006; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Clegg et al., 2012, 2013; 
Pina e Cunha et al., 2012; Marti & Fernandez, 2013) or participating in the management of 
global violence (Banerjee, 2008). Here, we are more interested in the mundane, everyday 
aspects of the organization of death. An emerging stream of research has started to question the 
meaning and consequences of death for organizations (Reedy & Learmonth, 2011). Noting that 
death anxieties and fantasies of immortality produce alienation and oppression (Sievers, 1990, 
1993), it encourages a more ‘authentic’ engagement with death (Smith, 2006) as a form of 
emancipation, as our feeling of finitude provides us with a ‘sense of ourselves as autonomous 
moral agents’ (Reedy & Learmonth, 2011, p.124). To contribute to this stream of literature, we 
study what Agamben (1998) calls a ‘regime of death’. We draw on his conceptualization of 
thanatopolitics and describe a set of mechanisms, technologies, discourses and power relations 
that together produce a ‘dispositif’ aiming at governing death 1 . We also relate these 
organizational dispositifs to fields of normativity that lead to the definition of what makes a life 
‘not worth living’. We thus extend the literature on death and organizations by showing how, 
                                               
1 On the concept of a dispositif, see Foucault (1978, 2004a, b) and Agamben (2009). 
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when an organization handles, manages and organizes support for the end of life, the 
organization of life itself – or biopolitics – is intertwined with attempts at governing death itself.  
Specifically, this article looks into the way the end of life is handled in a particular 
context: hospital geriatrics departments. It is based on an ethnographic study of the acute-care 
and palliative care geriatrics department of a French hospital. For two years we shadowed 
geriatricians to trace different points of view, organizational technologies, and discursive and 
material practices surrounding the end of life. We also filmed the department for two weeks, 
day and night, to make visible thanatopolitical practices, including the related material 
dispositifs. We thus contribute to the study of death and organizations by following people 
working on the front line of defence against our death anxieties (Willmott, 2000; Smith, 2006).  
The hospital units we study make death less visible and less disruptive for the other 
hospital departments, as well as for our everyday lives, but have to ‘face up’ to death (Reedy & 
Learmonth, 2011). Organizing end-of-life situations, they develop practices to guide life toward 
death (Sudnow, 1967; Seymour, 2000; Iedema et al., 2005). In response to death anxieties, they 
also provide rituals, guidance, discourses, and protocols to help others accept the idea that death 
is coming. We thus analyse the micro-practices and technologies that participate in the 
production of ‘normal death’, ‘comfortable death’ and ‘authentic’ engagements with death.  
Hospitals are not dedicated to death but to saving and prolonging life. Informed by 
biopolitics, they often make death invisible and taboo. They also tend to focus on what 
Agamben (1998) called ‘bare life’, conceived as biological minimum (Butler, 2004) or a merely 
bodily existence (Marti & Fernandez, 2013), thus denying the political dimension of life. We 
thus describe how hospitals set up dispositifs aiming at governing death that tend to deny the 
political life of the dying. However, we also show how political life can re-emerge and disrupt 
such organizational thanatopolitics. Instead of making political life invisible, death actually 
makes it impossible to conceal (Agamben, 1998). Geriatricians’ daily practices confront them 
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with the inescapably political dimension of life. The organization of death and related debates 
about what makes medical intervention appropriate raise fundamental questions about what 
makes a life worth living, who can decide not to prolong life, and based on which criteria.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the first section we review studies 
of death and organizations, and draw on the work of Agamben to propose a framework to study 
the organization of death. We then present the methodology, focusing on the specific difficulties 
raised by the practice of filming and observation in such a sensitive setting. The findings are 
reported in relation to three main issues. First, discussions between doctors and nurses illustrate 
how they collectively set up dispositifs aimed at governing death. Second, discussions between 
a doctor and a patient’s daughter show how geriatricians offer advice, rituals, and guidance to 
cope with our death anxieties, thereby including political life in the organization of death. Third, 
failures in the government of death illustrate how questions of what makes a life worth living 
influence organizational processes that are focused on life yet informed by death. The final 
discussion brings out the theoretical contributions of these results. 
Power over life and the organization of death 
Power over life, finitude and the management of death anxieties 
Literature on death and organizations remains scarce. And yet death increasingly occurs 
inside organizations. As Smith (2006) notes, this is probably due to the increasing separation 
of death from life in modern societies, which has been described as a social repression (Elias, 
1985) or the ‘sequestration’ (Giddens, 1991) of death. Studies of death and organizations tend 
to focus either on death as a metaphor or on the significance of death for organizational ethics.  
The research on death and organizations that treats death as a metaphor (Reedy & 
Learmonth, 2011) includes studies of ‘organizational death’ (Sutton, 1987; Barton 
Cunningham, 1997; Bell & Taylor, 2011; Bell, 2012; Bell et al., 2014; Cullen, 2014; Kelly & 
Riach, 2014), analyses of organizational identification as a struggle for immortality (Sievers, 
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1990, 1993), and descriptions of alienation as a form of symbolic death (Cederström & Fleming, 
2012; Fleming, 2014). However, Reedy and Learmonth (2011, p.119) argue that thinking of 
death as a metaphor ‘distances us from its brute materiality and (…) its capacity to make us 
face fundamental ethical questions about how we live our lives.’ Recent organization studies 
are now starting to treat death ‘as something more profound than merely a metaphor’ (Ready 
& Learmonth, 2011, p.119).  
For instance, several studies analyse how organizations produce what Mbembe (2003) 
calls necropolitics, or the subjugation of life to the power of death. Slavery, camps, ‘terror 
formations’ and colonial occupations all illustrate forms of necropower (Mbembe, 2003). 
Banerjee (2008), in particular, describes the role of organizations in such necropolitics. The 
organization and management of global violence (e.g., military coups, support for dictatorial 
regimes, violent repression of progressive parties and unions), the resurgence of privatized 
military forces, and communities being dispossessed of their land and access to natural 
resources illustrate the role of private corporations in the creation of ‘death worlds’ (Banerjee, 
2008, p.1547). Other studies concern organizations dedicated to violent death (Chwastiak, 
2001, 2006, 2013; Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Clegg et al., 2012, 2013; Pina e Cunha et al., 2012; 
Marti & Fernandez, 2013). These articles have highlighted how organizations systematize and 
rationalize violence, dehumanization, and murder. They raise fundamental questions about the 
purpose of organizations in regimes of oppression and dispossession.  
The other main focus in studies of death and organizations is on the role our feeling of 
finitude can play in organizational ethics. If alienation and oppression can be related to 
organizational members’ death anxieties and fantasies of immortality (Sievers, 1990, 1993) 
then their ability to ‘face up to death’ becomes central to questions of emancipation (Reedy & 
Learmonth, 2011), as contemplating death exposes the vanity and futility of the constant 
striving for organizational position and status. More fundamentally, for Smith (2006, p.229), 
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‘an authentic engagement with death is necessarily and inevitably uncomfortable, but it is only 
through this discomfort that we can genuinely come to know ourselves’. An awareness of our 
finitude, because it ‘encourages a more intersubjective view of our relations to others in 
organizations’, ‘can restore a sense of ourselves as autonomous moral agents’ (Reedy & 
Learmonth, 2011, pp.124-125). Death confronts us with our vulnerability, and hence other 
people’s vulnerability, encouraging identification with suffering itself, shaping ethical 
encounters and more generally the ties we have to others (Butler, 2004).  
However, an awareness of our finitude can trigger death anxieties (Grant & Wade-
Benzoni, 2009) and the feeling that ‘we are left alone to face death’ (Smith, 2006). Smith (2006) 
mentions the strategies people develop to ‘manage’ death and become more comfortable with 
its presence. Organizations are important in that respect, as they provide the attendants of death 
‘employed to render death invisible or, at least, minimally disruptive of normal appearances’ 
(Willmott, 2000, p.649), and who ‘occupy the front line of defence against our death anxieties’ 
(Smith, 2006, p.229). Yet according to Smith (2006, p.230), when ‘relegated’ to ‘the anonymity 
of the hospital’, death is ‘divested of meaning (deliberately so) [so that] we lack the resources 
to understand its significance. Moderns lack ritual; a shared response to death has been lost. 
We struggle alone even to find the right words’.  
Studying dying processes in a hospital setting, this paper observes rituals and analyses 
how meaning is restored through collective practices of ‘authentic’ engagement with death and 
attempts at fostering a ‘comfortable death’. Some people are ‘left alone to face death’, but this 
is not necessarily the case. Below, we review literature on the ‘orchestration’ of the process of 
dying in hospitals.  
Orchestrating the process of dying 
Literature describes the routines healthcare organizations produce to tame death anxieties 
(Candrian, 2014). Ethnographies of end-of-life settings have illustrated caregivers’ efforts at 
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negotiating (Glaser & Strauss, 1965, 1968), organizing (Sudnow, 1967), orchestrating 
(Seymour, 2000) and choreographing (Iedema et al., 2005) dying processes. These studies also 
highlight the ethical complexities attending end-of-life decisions. Seymour (2000), in 
particular, describes these decisions as processes of withdrawing or withholding medical 
treatment, that is, as ‘non-treatment decisions’. In trying to draw a line between ‘killing’ and 
‘allowing someone to die’, medical practitioners have to resolve definition problems between 
euthanasia and natural death (see also Glover, 1977, pp.191-200; Smith, 2006). This leads them 
to strive to orchestrate a ‘good’ death through ‘strategic’ withdrawal of treatment that creates a 
seemingly ‘natural’ death (Seymour, 2000).  
The orchestration of a ‘good death’ involves formalized organizational processes and less 
formal, ad hoc adjustments. Although ‘death must be made to seem an outcome of dying’ 
(Sudnow, 1967, p.95) this is achieved through a process involving extensive technical and 
human intervention. The medical staff manages the timing of treatment withdrawal to actively 
construct a ‘good death’, that is a death occurring at the ‘right time’ as ‘nature takes its course’ 
(Seymour, 2000). This is a way to maintain discretion and latitude in a situation of high 
uncertainty, but it also enables the doctors to include members of the patient’s family in the 
decision. Iedema et al. (2005) also include considerations of professional disputes and 
jurisdictions in their study of end-of-life care. They note that ‘a particularly sensitive area 
concerns the way that care vacillates between life-sustaining clinical intervention and modes of 
care that privilege comfort and support’ (p.846). A specific group of doctors, palliative care 
specialists, emerges to deal with patients who are close to death ‘on the assumption that dying 
has become inevitable’, which makes any intervention beyond pain control very difficult (ibid., 
p.852). They are called in by other medical practitioners only when ‘the patient is going to leave 
here to die’ and, for that reason, find their work labelled as ‘a low status specialty because it’s 
 8 
not about doing’ (ibid., p.851). As these quotes unambiguously show, providing comfort and 
support for the dying – that is, guiding them from dying to death – is not considered ‘doing’.  
These studies describe the complexities attending end-of-life decisions and illustrate the 
processes that take place around the timing of death. They show that the organized care of end-
of-life situations relates to the organization of ‘appropriate’ dying processes. They highlight 
how specific conceptions of ‘good’ and ‘natural’ death influence definitions of ‘normal’ dying 
processes. What remains largely implicit in these studies is the idea that this definition of 
normal dying is embedded in the dispositifs, technologies, and discourses related to contested 
fields of normativity. This is the focus of Agamben’s (1998) theorization of thanatopolitics. 
The next section thus discusses Agamben’s conceptualization of ‘regimes of death’ as attempts 
at governing death. 
Regimes of death and the politicization of life  
Ariès (1975) and Elias (1985) have shown that humans’ relationship with death depends 
on representations and rituals that are historically situated and socially constructed. Agamben 
(1998) complements these views by conceptualizing thanatopolitics as sets of dispositifs – 
mechanisms, technologies, discourses, and power relations that together produce a ‘regime of 
death’. Foucault (2004a, 2004b) conceptualizes biopolitics as a regime of government through 
which life itself becomes enmeshed within power relations (Rose, 2001; Munro, 2012; Fleming, 
2014). Agamben examines biopolitics in their final ramification, where the power over life 
extends to the very site which by definition escapes it, the site of death.  
Thanatopolitics is interesting when studying the organization of death as it relates the 
dispositifs that produce a regime of death to the fields of normativity that lead to the definition 
of what makes a life ‘not worth living’. Agamben (1998) looks at the thinking behind the 
definition of the value (or lack of value) of life as such. To understand what gives a life value, 
he examines the criteria used to designate an individual as homo sacer, i.e. a person who can 
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be killed without the killing counting as homicide. Agamben argues that a homo sacer is 
reduced to ‘bare life’, a life conceived as the biological minimum (Butler, 2004), a mere bodily 
existence (Marti & Fernandez, 2013) that has lost its political meaning and become ‘less-than-
human’ (Ten Bos, 2005). For Agamben, the loss of (legal) value of life is an eminently political 
event. It is even a ‘politicization’ of life, a generalization of politics to bare life, biopolitics. It 
is ‘a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, 
becomes only “sacred life”, and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society 
sets this limit; every society – even the most modern – decides who its “sacred men” will be’ 
(Agamben, 1998, p.81)2.  
This connects biopolitics and thanatopolitics by showing that the question of life is 
inseparable from the question of death. This is most visible in extermination camps where 
genocide is made possible through ‘othering’ and the related denial of people’s essential 
humanity (Stokes & Gabriel, 2010; Pina e Cunha et al., 2012; Marti & Fernandez, 2013; 
Annisette & Prasad, 2017). Fassin (2012) also shows how the organization of refugee camps 
tends to deny refugees’ political life. Chwastiak (2001, 2006) examines how planning, 
programming and budgeting in the US Department of Defense in the 1960s served to 
‘normalize’ nuclear war, transforming it from a horrific potentiality into a series of problems to 
be solved, thus converting ‘the unthinkable’ into a technical and mundane resource allocation 
                                               
2 Agamben does not refer to the contemporary definition of the ‘sacred’. Instead he 
studies the notion of ‘homo sacer’ in ancient Roman law, which he translates by ‘sacred life’ 
and ‘sacred men’. He shows that some individuals were designated as homo sacer, which meant 
that they were not to be sacrificed yet could be killed by anyone without the killing counting as 
homicide. They entered a ‘state of exception’, becoming a figure of exception embodying a life 
that only has legal existence through its exclusion. He goes on to show that this state of 
exception can be found today in many forms, including camps, where people are reduced to 
‘bare lives’ – or, at least, treated as such. He debated this idea with Judith Butler during a ‘public 
conversation about Eichmann, Law and Justice’ held at the European Graduate School in 2009.  
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problem. Organizations dedicated to death tend to reduce people to the state of bare life, 
denying their political life and treating them as homo sacer.  
Thanatopolitics also operates on a more everyday level. One particular example given by 
Agamben (1998) is euthanasia, which in his opinion illustrates the ‘fundamental biopolitical 
structure of modernity’ (ibid., p.80) since ‘from the perspective of modern biopolitics […] 
euthanasia is situated at the intersection of the sovereign decision on life that may be killed and 
the assumption of the care of the nation’s biological body. Euthanasia signals the point at which 
biopolitics necessarily turns into thanatopolitics’ (ibid., p.83). 
Agamben analyses several different situations, including that of the individual no longer 
able to decide between life and death (no longer displaying the will to live nor a desire to die) 
– then, the expert (a doctor, psychiatrist or legal professional) will make ‘the final decision’ 
(ibid., p.81). This is particularly visible in ‘resus’ departments, when a doctor must decide 
whether or not to resuscitate a person. Agamben writes that this point in time ‘delimits a space 
of exception in which a purely bare life, entirely controlled by man and his technology, appears 
for the first time. And since it is precisely a question not of a natural life but of an extreme 
embodiment of homo sacer (…), what is at stake is, once again, the definition of a life that may 
be killed without the commission of homicide’ (ibid., p.94). The very concept of death is 
becoming ambiguous and indeterminate, and its definition is a source of controversy (Sudnow, 
1967; Agamben, 1998; Butler, 2004; Smith, 2006). Death is no longer an event for scientific 
observation, it only acquires clear meaning through a decision: it is not noted, but performed.  
This paper focuses on the organization of death in geriatrics departments. As we show 
below, geriatrics departments bring out a number of questions concerning the end of life and 
what makes a life worth living. We thus examine thanatopolitical dispositifs – the rituals, the 
mechanisms, the technologies used to accompany the dying. Through this examination we try 
to understand the extent to which the dying are reduced to bare lives, or instead whether their 
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political life is recognized and included in thanatopolitics. We now detail the methods we 
followed to examine these questions empirically.  
An ethnographic study of an acute-care geriatrics department 
Our approach to the field 
This article is part of a broader research project concerning hospital management. In this 
project’s first stage we studied the succession of public hospital reforms in France. We obtained 
access to acute-care and palliative care geriatrics units at a hospital in the Paris region. In June 
2010, one of the department’s doctors said: ‘To understand us, it’s important to follow our 
work’. They asked us to see things through their eyes, to observe what was involved in their 
practice. And we decided to follow them, quite literally. This was the start of our ethnographic 
field study, which was spread over two years. The first author and Carine (a documentary 
director) were present throughout the entire field study, and two co-authors joined the team 
after the data collection.   
We drew inspiration from the organizational ethnographic approach developed by the 
symbolic interactionists (Geer et al., 1961; Glaser & Strauss, 1965; 1968; Strauss & Glaser, 
1970; Hughes, 1971; Becker, 1998), and immersed ourselves in the organization for a 
prolonged period of time to understand the actors’ stances and daily practices. We practiced 
‘shadowing’ (Czarniawska, 2007), following a doctor around every day, wearing a white coat 
with notebooks and coloured pens in the pocket as a way of blending in to the department 
(although we always introduced ourselves as management researchers). We were assigned a 
specific place, as we shadowed doctors rather than other medical staff. To gain acceptance, we 
embarked on a socialization process that was not entirely dissimilar to the socialization of junior 
doctors, including learning the tacit rules and norms of appropriate behaviour, and only took 
notes once back at home. Little by little, relationships with the doctors and junior doctors were 
developed to the point of becoming actual friendships.  
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The doctors showed us how they work and how their day is organized, but they also talked 
about the questions they ask themselves, their doubts, pleasures and pains. Their openness about 
their doubts was a specific characteristic of this unit. The head of department requires 
newcomers to question their assumptions, remain humble and accept their own vulnerability. 
As he observed: ‘To treat a patient, you have to connect with him, and therefore be willing to 
be vulnerable’. He considered vulnerability a prerequisite for meaningful contact with patients 
in ‘their fragility as dying people’. Our overall attitude mirrored our informants’ attitude toward 
their own work. This particularly sensitive field of observation required considerable 
commitment and aroused continuous reflexive consideration of our role as researchers. As well 
as exercising empathy and paying constant attention to what was important to the people under 
observation, we needed to be accepted as legitimate researchers by our informants, and that 
required acknowledgement of our own vulnerability. This vulnerability also meant resisting 
temptation to introduce preconceived ideas and interpretations. As we wrote in the fieldnotes: 
‘This field deals with death and how to die. Among other questions, it raises the question of 
end-of-life care’ (Fieldnotes, 29/06/2010). Empathy entails an openness to surprise, and in fact 
we frequently experienced genuine emotional difficulty. Vulnerability entails acceptance of 
potential unsettlement.  
Video ethnography 
After a year, the staff and patients became used to our presence, and in March 2011, we 
decided to spend two weeks in the department, day and night, with a camera. All the people 
filmed or interviewed gave us informed, written consent. It is unsettling having a camera in an 
acute-care and palliative care department, yet both the staff and patients were receptive to our 
arguments. We explained what we wanted to understand, and how the camera would enable us 
to observe and record what the medical staff repeatedly referred to as ‘the invisible work’, in 
order to make it visible. One of our objectives is to propose the final documentary film as a 
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learning tool for junior doctors, although it has not been edited yet for reasons of time and 
budget.  
Filming is both a research method (Kunter & Bell, 2006, p. 169-189), and a product of 
research (Sooryamoorthy, 2007, p. 547-563). We filmed emergency situations, and situations 
where nothing appeared to be happening. We used a medium-sized camera and a boom 
microphone – so we were not discreet. This unmissable physical presence made our identity 
very clear, thus avoiding any misleading impression. We filmed in a wide shot to capture all 
the different interactions. We filmed the morning meetings, handovers, discussions with 
families, conversations in the hospital rooms with patients, doctors and junior doctors, meetings 
with the social worker, and the doctors’ routine work. We deliberately refrained from filming 
actual medical care given to the patients. We did not obtain permission to film administrative 
meetings, but were allowed to attend and take notes.  
To make our documentary, we had to sift through more than 30 hours of unedited film. 
The analysis began with the first viewing, which lasted several months. We noted the 
timecodes, with a description of the pictures, the picture quality, what each sequence showed, 
and what was on the soundtrack, including silences and machine noises. The first author and 
the documentary maker then put together a preliminary cut. The first author produced a ‘shot-
by-shot analysis’, which served as raw material to produce initial interpretations. A turning 
point in the analysis arose when the first author watched the film again, seeing each scene 
several times, over several months. Out-of-shot matters were made visible by the work done 
with the camera. Barthes was helpful for this, with his distinction between the studium 
(photography in general) and the punctum (a particular detail) (see also Davison, 2007). ‘In this 
habitually unary space, occasionally (but alas all too rarely) a ‘detail’ attracts me. I feel that its 
mere presence changes my reading, that I am looking at a new photograph, marked in my eyes 
with a higher value. This ‘detail’ is the punctum’ (Barthes, 1980, p. 71). The initial team of 
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researchers had embarked on the field study with the objective of focusing on medical reforms, 
the studium, but a major question emerged from the field and took them to an ‘out of shot’ 
punctum: the question of dying.  
When two further researchers joined the team after the fieldwork ended, the film 
considerably facilitated their engagement with the field. The film clips themselves provided 
more depth and direct exposition, leading us to seek out additional details and explanations, 
and fostering collective reflexivity within the team of researchers as we realized that we were 
each struck by a different ‘punctum’. This process brought the ‘new’ researchers to act as film 
editors3, and the coding emerged from our reactions and interactions concerning the punctum 
we found important. Ultimately this led to the first author being asked to provide additional 
material (interviews, journal excerpts) that could further explain or contradict our 
interpretations.  
It became clear that the film clips constituted key materials to grasp the political life of 
dying, sometimes voiceless patients. They displayed presences and absences, provided access 
to non-verbal communication between actors such as eye contact or silences in conversations, 
and allowed the researchers to feel the emotions surrounding the patients. However, videos are 
not self-explanatory and need to be retranslated back into the context from which they were 
extracted (Zundel et al., 2018)4. To do that, instead of providing the videos themselves, we 
quote written transcripts and contextualised scenes taken from the videos.  
                                               
3 In a traditional configuration, the film editor is usually unfamiliar with the field, and 
their only access to it is through the footage. Footage is the raw, unedited material as originally 
recorded by a video camera. Film editing is thus comparable to the writing of the story that 
emerges from analysis of the footage. To borrow Wiseman’s metaphor (Wiseman and Clouzot, 
1976, p.24), ‘the footage is the experience of the novelist, and the editing is the writing’. 
4 We would like to thank Mike Zundel, acting editor, for his suggestion to engage in this 
debate. 
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The geriatrics department studied 
This geriatrics department we study covers two floors, with 22 beds on each floor. There 
are 33 nurses and nursing auxiliaries for the two floors, supervised by a nursing manager. Two 
doctors and two junior doctors work on the second floor, where all of our research took place. 
Each room contains two beds, except in palliative care which uses single rooms (an extra bed 
can be added for a family member). The nurses and nursing auxiliaries work in three shifts 
(6am-2pm, 2-9pm, and 9pm-6am). The night shift is covered by one nurse and two nursing 
auxiliaries for all 44 beds.  
The department manager wanted to develop a geriatrics service appropriate to the specific 
characteristics of the age group, and has trained his teams in palliative care. All the nurses in 
the department are young (under 30), except for the night nurses (who are over 40). The work 
is not easy in these departments, and nurses generally move on after a short while, despite a 
bonus paid to newly-qualified nurses joining a geriatric department.  
Each day begins with a handover meeting involving two nurses and two doctors. The 
doctors add notes to their paper files and give the nurses their instructions. Next, the doctors 
begin their rounds to see all the patients, pushing two very large trolleys, one for the computer 
and the other holding the patient files. The nursing auxiliaries change the beds and wash the 
patients. The nurses are in charge of giving out the medication. At lunchtime, if any patients 
are being discharged, the doctors must dictate the discharge letters to the medical secretaries. 
During the afternoon, the doctors fill in the patient discharge and admission files. They then see 
the new incoming patients and meet their families. At the end of the day, the doctor assesses 
the cost of the discharged patients by putting data into management databases. 
Empirical findings 
This paper studies the organization of death in a setting dedicated to biopolitics. We now 
present various scenes that highlight interactions between caregivers and relatives around the 
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death of a patient. First, discussions between doctors and nurses illustrate how they collectively 
set up dispositifs aiming at governing death. Second, discussions between a doctor and a 
patient’s daughter show how geriatricians offer advice, rituals, and guidance to cope with death 
anxieties, thereby including political life in the government of death. Third, failures in the 
organization of death illustrate how questions of what makes a life worth living influence 
organizational processes that are focused on life yet informed by death.  
Managing the unmanageable  
Geriatricians help patients’ families prepare themselves, by raising their death 
awareness. Yet death often remains unpredictable, catching both doctors and families 
unprepared. Surprisingly, unexpected recoveries can also create tensions between doctors and 
patients’ families, as the following scene illustrates: 
The 95-year-old patient Mrs G had stopped eating, she was very weak and 
visibly no longer wanted to live. Her family, which includes several doctors 
and surgeons, decided to send her to the palliative care unit in agreement 
with Philippe, the head of the department. So the whole family is sure, and 
has accepted the idea, that she is going to die there. But it so happens that in 
the last few days the patient’s attitude and discourse have changed. She has 
agreed to eat a little. She calls the junior doctor ‘dearie’. The junior doctor 
(and the geriatrician) have the impression she wants to get better, get over 
her condition. Philippe has to call the family to review the ‘medical plan’, in 
other words convince them they need to change tack. He explains in some 
embarrassment that this is made more difficult by the fact they are doctors.  
This is an illustration of a case when a death surprises people by its absence. Since Mrs G 
was behaving as if she felt her life was no longer worth living, her family have prepared for her 
death. But she suddenly regains a will to live. The doctor suggests discharging her from 
palliative care, which means treating her as a person who is going to live, not a person who is 
going to die. Her life is worth living after all. The condition of homo sacer is not always 
inescapable and thresholds are not points of no return. Although pleased to see their patient 
come ‘back to life’, the geriatricians have to negotiate with the patient’s family: they have 
already been through the difficult step of death awareness, and will now have to go through it 
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a second time. A recovery can be as disturbing as a loss, and this needs to be dealt with by the 
caregivers.  
In the subsequent sections we examine how the medical staff actually organizes and 
‘manages’ the dying process and create a dispositif around death to guide our conduct in 
response to death. 
Dying patient, homo sacer and political life  
In palliative care units, the medical staff expect death to come for a large number of 
patients, and protocols and routines are set up accordingly. In the hospital studied, the palliative 
care unit is part of the geriatrics department. The medical team simultaneously works with 
‘dying’ and ‘non-dying’ patients, and some patients pass from one status to the other during 
their stay. As the following transcript of a scene we filmed illustrates, the medical team meets 
to question the relevance of treating a particular patient, collectively discussing whether a dying 
patient should be considered as a bare life. 
[During the morning handover meeting, in the nurses’ office, as the files are 
passed on to the next team from the night shift. The people present are 
Philippe, a doctor in the palliative care unit, and two nurses, one of whom is 
called Aurélie. The nurses read their notes to the doctor. But when it comes 
to the case of Mrs M, Aurélie dares to put a question directly to Philippe.] 
Aurélie [putting down her files, and instead looking Philippe in the eye, as 
he calmly returns her gaze]: I’ve got lots of palliative care patients in my 
section, one of them is a lady, Mrs M, in room 10. She’s in palliative care, 
she came in for respiratory distress. (…) She’s asleep, but you can tell that 
breathing is still difficult for her. (…) So if you can go and see her, just to see 
about her breathing. Yes, just to see, so we can adapt the medication if 
necessary. 
Philippe: We’ll see whether we keep on increasing the morphine; if we should 
leave her on the oxygen… Well the problem is, if we stop the oxygen, that’s 
bound to speed things up. It’s another stage.  
A [slightly agitated]: What I don’t understand about this lady is that she’s on 
antibiotics, she’s on a high-dose drip… 
P [calmly]: Well, everything we’re doing that can be justified because it 
makes her more comfortable, that’s not a problem. I mean if we think that 
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giving her oxygen and [an antibiotic] will help her breathe better, it’s not a 
problem even if she’s in palliative care, why shouldn’t we? (…) But we still 
need to ask ourselves if there’s any benefit, if even the antibiotics have any 
benefit, we can reduce her infection and her congestion, and make her more 
comfortable. 
A: At the moment, there’s no congestion… 
P: But after a while, the question arises of whether we should continue, that’s 
the thing, should we continue? In any case, it has to be reassessed. It isn’t to 
prolong her life, it’s to try and improve her living conditions. But I’ll have a 
look anyway, see how long it’s been prescribed and maybe cut back a little 
bit. 
A: Yes, OK. 
P: The only certainty is that if she starts taking breaks, and if she’s at 77% 
saturation and we stop the oxygen, that’ll speed things up. But we’re really 
within the legal framework. We can stop treatments that aren’t necessary to 
keep her comfortable even if stopping them means things will move faster. 
A: All right. [Aurélie goes back to her notes and reads them silently]. 
This scene illustrates how caregivers ‘face up’ to death, engaging in reflexivity through 
collective discussion, and constitute themselves as moral subjects. The nurses actively question 
the treatments given. They express concerns neither because of the fear of killing, nor the cost 
of irrelevant treatment, but over the perceived risk of excessive medication. Since the patient 
‘is asleep’, meaning she can no longer move or communicate, she might be considered to have 
a life no longer worth living, to have become homo sacer, which raises questions about the 
usefulness of treatment. The doctor acknowledges that the aim is no longer to restore health, 
yet refuses to consider the patient as a bare life. Keeping her ‘comfortable’, allowing death to 
happen yet ‘improv[ing] her living conditions’ – even in death the political life of the patient, 
not mere physiology, guides the process. Caregivers set up a dispositif of death, by comparing 
their impressions and discussing what makes a life worth living but also by defining the 
technical organization of death, including the protocols to follow, i.e. the practices, techniques, 
and tools (molecules, life-support systems) to be used. The regime of death, which is centred 
on the comfort of the patient, recognizes political life and aims at producing a ‘peaceful’ death.  
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Orchestrating without controlling: taming anxieties and creating comforting 
rituals 
Collective coordination to set up a dispositif of death is important, as caregivers must 
explain the various stages of the treatment to the patient’s family. The presence of relatives 
makes political life particularly visible. The following scene we filmed concerns the same 
patient as above and starts in her room, where the doctor has come to talk to the daughter: 
Philippe: We reviewed the situation with the nurses this morning. Apparently 
she [Mrs M] isn’t in any pain. 
C. (the patient’s daughter): That’s really what we wanted from the beginning. 
As soon as she had her accident, as soon as they called me at the care home, 
as soon as she had her accident, straight away they made it clear… and even 
when you know… well… it’s hard to accept… so what my brother and I 
wanted most of all was that Mum shouldn’t be in pain, that’s essential to us, 
because we know very well that the only outcome… 
Philippe: We assess the situation thoroughly when we come and see to her, 
when we change her position, when we wash her, if we have to give her an 
injection… So apparently, every time we do something for her, we haven’t 
seen any sign of suffering or distress, not even indirectly. Yes, that’s right, so 
that’s the main thing. 
C: Yes, you’re right. In the beginning, just after she’d been in A&E, her face 
was starting to look drawn, and Mum has always been strong… We could see 
her eyes screwing up… Since she’s been here she’s been peaceful… You 
sometimes suspect when her breathing gets a bit too loud… and so then I was 
told ‘come and tell us’… and you do something straight away to help her rest, 
well, er…[C becomes very emotional] 
P: Perhaps we should go and talk outside. [They leave the patient’s room 
and stand in the corridor.] So I went to examine her and see her again this 
morning. What’s happening is that she’s being given certain types of 
medication to keep her comfortable, like the antibiotics, like the diuretics as 
well, to reduce the symptoms that could in fact cause a few more breathing 
problems and discomfort; all this medication, and the oxygen too, obviously 
have the benefit of prolonging her life a little bit. There’s no doubt that some 
of this medication, well, we might find ourselves having to stop them 
gradually, that could result in things moving faster. 
C: You mean you’re going to reduce the antibiotics… 
P: Yes, that’s right. 
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C.: …and give her more morphine? 
P: That’s right, morphine, Hypnovel… in fact Dr B must have discussed that 
with you. 
C.: Yes, he has, he said that for the moment he was keeping a balance between 
the two so, um, if… 
P.: Yes, that’s right. 
C.: But that could mean taking her off the antibiotics and in that case the end 
would be near. 
P: If we stop the antibiotics, if we stop the diuretics, and maybe at some stage 
we’ll have to stop the oxygen. [The patient’s daughter looks surprised] But if 
we take her off the oxygen, that would only be if we were certain, and were 
actually increasing the sedatives enough, that it wouldn’t be uncomfortable 
for her. 
C. [in a choked voice]: Yes, what we mustn’t do is make her feel she’s 
suffocating. 
P: No, no, we’ll really do everything that has to be done so she’s even faster 
asleep when we get to that point. 
C.: But will you tell me when you do? 
P: Of course, we won’t do anything, we’ll tell you every time, no, no we won’t 
change anything without you being informed. 
How can death awareness be raised despite social repression and sequestration of death? 
This scene shows caregivers creating rituals to help relatives acknowledge what cannot be said 
or shown: ‘Death is approaching’. Rituals require the involvement of participants and reaffirm 
the political life of the dying, even when the patient is unconscious and voiceless. The doctor 
takes time to listen to the fears of the patient’s daughter, guides her through her vulnerability, 
evokes the dying process, and explains how the caregivers will ‘manage’ the patient’s pain. 
They move together from a sequestration of death to a sequestration of pain in an attempt to 
tame their death anxieties and produce shared responses to death.  
However, the medical techniques of pain management can be misleading. By hiding the 
symptoms, pain management can give the impression that the patient’s general condition is 
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improving – ‘Since she’s been here she’s been peaceful’. The doctor clarifies the situation and 
makes sure it is understood that ‘the end [is] near’ – dying will be peaceful, but death is 
inevitable. The patient will not ‘feel she’s suffocating’ but ‘will be even faster asleep’, a 
metaphor which reintroduces a passing reference to the quintessential peaceful death (at least 
in the general imagination), which is fantasized as natural – dying in one’s sleep. The dispositifs 
and rituals of death aim at producing a peaceful death to sequestrate the pain of both patients 
and their relatives.  
The ritual does not serve to isolate a bare life so much as to include political life in the 
dying process. It helps to convey a sense that the situation is well-organized and under the 
control of a group of experts, while also acknowledging the political life of the dying person – 
family and relatives are included (‘we won’t change anything without you being informed’). 
The doctor explains the details of the treatment, including the stages to come. This helps create 
a feeling that what is to follow can be anticipated and hence prepared for. As the further 
development of the interaction shows, the doctor even takes time to answer non-medical 
questions:  
C.: Because I’ve just sent my brother back home to his family. My brother 
and sister both live a long way away… My sister’s just got here [they live in 
a different town]. I keep them informed all the time, so I mustn’t take them by 
surprise. 
P.: I’m not going to change anything today, we’ll reassess the situation 
tomorrow, I’m just going to make sure that she really isn’t in pain. That 
means examining her a bit and seeing if she’s free of congestion and there’s 
no pain or discomfort in her stomach. That’s all I’m going to look at today, I 
won’t change the medication. It’s possible that in the next few days we might 
have to make changes but those changes, of course you’ll be informed. Are 
you bearing up OK? because you’re here all the time… 
C.: No, I’m OK, my sister took over for two nights (…) it’s true that it’s a bit 
stressful but what’s also good about it is that it’s the balance with life (…) a 
balance with home because my little girl, I tell her [what’s happening], she 
knows her gran’s in hospital (…), and that if I come home then she’s feeling 
better… but I can’t tell her anything more because there’s no point, I don’t 
know what I should do, in fact I don’t know what I should or shouldn’t say. 
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(…) Can my little girl, she’s 12, would she be allowed to come and give her 
gran a kiss? 
P.: That’s absolutely no problem, we’re very flexible about that sort of thing. 
Of course it’s not a problem. (…) 
C.: Perhaps we should do that today?  
P.: You could… Anyway things can always take a turn for the worse. We have 
no control at all over the duration. Which is just as well. 
The political life of the dying person is at the heart of the discussion between the doctor 
and the patient’s daughter. The ritualized orchestration of visits from relatives serves to 
acknowledge and include the political life of the dying. The caregivers enable the passage from 
life to death to be shared by the family, who do not explicitly ask to be present at the death but 
must be prepared for separation and the mourning process. However, the anticipation, 
preparation, and organization of the event should not give a feeling that death is organized and 
decided. Although the outcome is now certain, the moment of death remains unclear. The 
process is organized and under control (‘I’m not going to change anything today, we’ll reassess 
the situation tomorrow’) but ‘things can always take a turn for the worse’. As the doctor 
concludes: ‘We have no control at all over the duration. Which is just as well.’ The doctor can 
suggest dying and mourning rituals but, to remain ‘natural’, death cannot be controlled.  
As this scene highlights, organized dying is or should be unsurprising to both the medical 
staff, and to the patient’s family. In this sense, a ‘normal’ death becomes a death that can be 
anticipated and organized. Yet the idea of ‘managing’ death remains ambiguous: the idea of a 
‘natural’ – and therefore uncontrollable – process must be retained, and yet that process must 
be anticipated, planned for, and organized. Although such a process involves extensive 
technical and human intervention, ‘death must be made to seem an outcome of dying’ (Sudnow, 
1967, p.95). Beyond technical aspects, medical staff draw on metaphors and euphemisms – 
patients are ‘asleep’ – to create an imagined natural death. They try to perform a good death, 
which is a dying process that is both peaceful and orchestrated.  
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Working on the front line in the sequestration of death, geriatricians have to organize 
dying processes to help people manage their death anxieties. They orchestrate the ‘passing’ in 
a way that must look organized but not entirely controlled. Such a dispositif combines techno-
medical aspects with ethical issues and sociological rituals, which together produce a 
government of death. This, we argue, answers Smith’s (2006) remark that late modernity lacks 
rituals and shared responses to facing death. As we have shown, specialized caregivers can 
organize dying processes in a hospital setting. Rituals include pain management and the 
patient’s bare life but also the political life of the dying person. They help guide relatives as 
their identity evolves from a patient’s family to a dying person’s family to a deceased person’s 
family, in a process of socialization of death (Elias, 1985). These dispositifs of death support 
collective participation and coordination, preparedness, and the emergence of a sense that the 
process is under control. Below, we examine what happens when such organization of death 
fails. 
Governing death: ethical decisions and collective reflexivity on what makes a life 
worth living 
The caregivers we followed strive to organize dying processes in an attempt to manage 
the unmanageable. Their attempts are not always successful. The following scene happened 
during the geriatricians’ morning rounds: 
[Two doctors, Philippe and Marine, enter a patient’s room] A shock awaits 
them: the patient has just died, probably four or five minutes before the two 
doctors walked in. The patient was weak, which is why he was in a room 
alone, but was ‘recovering well’ despite complicated heart problems. The 
nurses washed him twenty minutes ago and he seemed to be doing very well. 
Philippe decides it is too late to resuscitate. A silence follows. He then 
explains that there is too great a risk that the man might then remain in a 
vegetative state. Philippe says ‘Life is violent, we know that when we’re 
born.’ The two doctors appear to be genuinely moved, and have tears in their 
eyes. 
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The team that had been looking after this man wonder about this death and 
feel the need to talk about it. Lucie (a nurse) goes into the room and stands 
still there for a few minutes in silence, with tears in her eyes. Christian (a 
doctor) comes in – he was absent because he had gone to get an opinion from 
the cardiology department, in order to adjust the treatment for this very 
patient. The three doctors discuss the patient’s death. Philippe regrets having 
had a meeting with the psychiatrist immediately beforehand: if the cardiac 
arrest had happened before their eyes, they would have resuscitated the 
patient. Marine, the junior doctor, asks Christian later in the morning 
whether they should have sent the patient to intensive care the day before. 
Christian answers that he’d shown a significant improvement, and intensive 
care would never have accepted him because there were no signs of 
emergency. They are palpably troubled by this sudden death. They need to 
talk it over together for around fifteen minutes. Then they resume their 
rounds, but they seem upset all morning. At the very end of the morning, one 
of the nurses again talks to me about the patient who died. 
Despite being in regular contact with death (there is around one death a week), the 
medical team are sometimes surprised, and saddened, by the death of a patient. The death was 
discovered peacefully, with no fuss: no alarm was triggered, there was no emergency situation, 
the patient simply passed away quietly – this could easily be considered the picture of a good, 
peaceful, ‘natural’ death. And yet this death upsets the medical staff. Two factors are notable: 
the unexpectedness of this death, and the feeling that they could have prevented it. They feel 
challenged regarding their ability to act and anticipate. Their role is either to cure, or to set up 
the rituals of the dying process. In this case they failed in both of these duties.  
Despite the feeling of powerlessness, it should be noted that the scene opens with an 
important decision by the doctors: whether or not to resuscitate the patient, or ‘bring him back 
to life’. This option is ruled out in consideration of the potential outcome for the patient: ‘there 
is too great a risk that the man might then remain in a vegetative state’. There is thus ambiguity 
in the action of restoring life: the same action, depending on the situation, can be considered as 
a way to save a patient, or as overzealousness; they would have liked to save him (keeping him 
in his previous condition) but do not want to resuscitate him to a future condition deemed 
unsatisfactory. There is no point in resuscitating a bare life.  
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The unanticipated death, despite its strong resemblance to a ‘natural’ death, exposes the 
vanity of attempts at governing death. Beyond any inward, introspective feeling of finitude 
(Reedy & Learmonth, 2011), ‘bare’ death causes intersubjective confrontations with 
vulnerability (Butler, 2004, 2009). To tame their anxieties, the caregivers engage in 
spontaneous gatherings, discuss their views, or simply stand silently together in front of the 
body. They examine and talk over what happened, engage in critical reflexivity in a struggle to 
restore the meaning of death (‘Life is violent, we know that when we’re born’). Beyond the 
ethical complexities of deciding that a life is no longer worth living, and beyond the socio-
political issue of choosing how people should die, thanatopolitics here appears as an attempt at 
governing death in a process that is not entirely determined, but guided and orchestrated. The 
fragility of such attempts is exposed by the elusiveness of political life and the impossibility of 
ruling out bare death.  
Discussion  
Our sense of finitude makes us aware of our vulnerability, which Butler (2004, 2009) 
describes as the first step to our confrontation with the vulnerability of others and hence to our 
constitution as moral subjects. Such feelings also trigger death anxieties and discomfort in 
modern societies marked by a ‘social repression’ of death (Elias, 1985). To make death less 
visible and disruptive, specialized organizations ‘sequestrate’ death (Giddens, 1991; Willmott, 
2000; Smith, 2006) to isolate us from the ethical, political, and organizational complexities of 
the ‘management’ of death. Death increasingly occurs inside organizations, such as hospitals 
and hospices. Yet little is known about how ‘natural’ death occurs, and is ‘managed’, inside 
organizations. Even when it is anonymous and mundane, death creates what Agamben (1998) 
calls a ‘state of exception’, a disruption of governmentality that, instead of destabilizing 
sovereign power, in fact acts to establish the exceptional as a naturalized norm (Butler, 2004). 
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We thus analyse the micro-practices and technologies that participate in the production of 
‘normal death’. 
Death increasingly takes place in organizations that are chiefly dedicated to life. Hospitals 
aim at prolonging, maintaining, and even restoring life – they are governed by, and organize, 
the aim of caring for the nation’s biological body, or biopolitics (Foucault, 2004a, b). Life 
becomes the main target and objective of power (Rose, 2001; Munro, 2012; Fleming, 2014). In 
a setting dedicated to biopolitics, the occurrence of death can prove disruptive. Death becomes 
a taboo and must remain invisible. The intrusion of death is not only a source of anxiety, but 
also an indication of failure and limitation in biopolitics.  
Geriatrics departments, dedicated to the care of ‘older patients’, are recurrently 
confronted with death. Previous studies note that a historical ‘brutal revolution’ in Western 
attitudes toward death (Ariès, 1975) has led to more social repression (Elias, 1985) and 
sequestration (Giddens, 1991) of death, with organizations working to protect us from the 
associated anxieties (Willmott, 2000; Smith, 2006). These organizations of death sequestration, 
however, are dedicated not to facing up to death but to governing it. If ‘we are left alone to face 
death’ (Smith, 2006) even when death happens inside highly-populated organizations, this is 
because the purpose of these ‘attendants of death’ is not necessarily to help us to face up to the 
idea of death but rather to provide routines, mechanisms, and processes to follow while dying.  
When death becomes inevitable then it must be organized. Previous studies analyse this 
phenomenon, but without resituating it in the context of governmentality and biopolitics 
(Foucault, 2004a, b). Glaser and Strauss (1965; 1968) long ago described how death disturbs 
hospital routines. But they also show that caregivers encourage what they perceive as 
acceptable styles of facing death, and acceptable styles of living while dying. Acceptable dying 
is about accepting yet fighting death, avoiding too much disruption (unacceptably ‘disgraceful’ 
deaths) but also too little (apathy and withdrawal), striving until the end to prolong and 
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maximize life. Supporting biopolitics remains the purpose of these organizations. Biopower 
dictates legitimate practices even for dying.  
An organization of the end of life is focused on life and biopower yet informed by death. 
Organizations that are frequently confronted with death develop mechanisms, technologies, 
practices, and relationships to make it less disruptive. These dispositifs constitute a regime of 
death (Agamben, 1998), a form of power which reaches life through its final ramification – 
death itself. In such a setting, organizations operate where sovereign power over life intersects 
with the governmentality of death. Biopolitics turns into thanatopolitics. 
Hospital thanatopolitics – official mechanisms, technologies, and discourses of how to 
govern death – tend to be founded on a definition of life that negates its political meaning – 
which Agamben (1998) calls bare life. A patient’s remaining lifetime, or physiological aspects 
as reified in the utterance of technical constants, are used to assess whether life remains 
recognizable as such. The organizational guidance regarding death tends to ignore political life. 
This is visible in the focus on bodies, which are treated as a collection of organs, and moved 
from ward to ward and from bed to bed. In some cases, being moved from a double room to a 
single room is the one and only signal that ‘the patient’s end is near’. 
Our ethnographic study shows how political life can re-emerge, intrude into this 
carefully-orchestrated scene, and disrupt organizational thanatopolitics. Although the 
organization is focused on bare life, individual caregivers include political life in their 
assessments of whether a life remains worth living. For instance, they constantly mention the 
quality of life with associated labels such as ‘vital energy’, ‘intellectual faculties’, 
‘independence’ or ‘loss of autonomy’, and consider the patient’s relatives. In such moments, 
political life can take precedence over bare life. The organization of the end of life ‘delimits a 
space of exception’ (Agamben, 1998, p.94) but this space of exception is not a space where a 
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purely bare life emerges. Death eludes attempts to separate its political and physiological 
manifestations.  
Organizations dedicated to the end of life thus constitute places where people work to 
face up to the irreducible political dimension of death. Beyond mere negotiations to claim 
control over the process and maintain work routines (Glaser & Strauss, 1965; 1968), 
interactions with families and the time caregivers take to guide them through thanatopolitics 
are attempts at including the political life of the dying in their practice. Some caregivers may 
remain reluctant to see political life disrupt thanatopolitics, and strive to focus on bare life 
instead. But through biopolitical discussions and dispositifs, organizational thanatopolitics 
meets the socio-political aspects of (end-of-)life. Death does not make political life invisible 
but impossible to conceal (Agamben, 1998). Death disrupts life, but (political) life disrupts 
(power over) death. An organization of the end of life is focused on death and thanatopolitics 
yet informed by (political) life. Political life constitutes a partial and fragile destabilization of 
thanatopolitics.  
These findings contribute to our understanding on how the end of life can be humanized 
or dehumanized. According to Smith (2006), inside organizations, death becomes anonymous 
and divested of meaning. Beyond work routines around dying processes (Glaser & Strauss, 
1965; 1968), Smith (2006) argues that we need rituals to deal with death. In hospitals, the 
medical experts are the people who can create such rituals for us and guide us towards death. 
When depoliticized mechanisms of rational calculation take the place of ethical judgment and 
collective action, death becomes dehumanized. The constitution of new rituals, efforts to ensure 
a ‘comfortable death’ and the provision of guidance and shared responses to death can help 
humanize the end of life.  
Organizations thus provide us with experts whose job it is to assess the political relevance 
of a life, deciding what makes the value of life as such. Yet, as Agamben (1998) argues, there 
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is no consensus about what makes a life worth living. Organizations dedicated to the end of life 
work at the intersection point between alternative fields of normativity regarding what gives a 
life value. Organizational thanatopolitics thus develops despite the absence of any unified field 
of normativity to assess what makes a life not worth living (Agamben, 1998) or unrecognizable 
as life (Butler, 2009). The people we followed for this research have to decide when it is 
appropriate not to prolong life. To do so, they regularly share and discuss their doubts about 
what makes a life worth living, designating the point at which life ceases to be politically 
relevant. They can thus designate (or ‘let die’) someone as homo sacer (Agamben, 1998), a life 
that can be eliminated with impunity. And yet they are not entirely free to make these decisions, 
as they work in cooperation with other departments, most of which are dedicated to biopolitics 
and remain outside thanatopolitics. Death itself is enmeshed within power relations. 
Organizational dispositifs, biopolitics, and thanatopolitics all influence the end of life in ways 
that are not always consistent with the caregivers’ ethics.  
A more ‘authentic’ engagement with death constitutes a form of emancipation (Smith, 
2006; Reedy & Learmonth, 2011) from biopolitics, but we show that death disrupts biopolitics 
only to turn it into thanatopolitics. Governmentality itself remains. We thus argue that political 
life, not death, can disrupt governmentality. We also argue that acknowledging our vulnerability 
is how we include political life in our idea of what makes a life worth living, and thus disrupt 
dehumanizing forms of power. This challenges common views of organizations, which 
themselves tend to reproduce the social repression of death. Organization studies rarely 
recognise the central importance of our vulnerability or the significance of our feeling of 
finitude. When they do, they see it as a weakness. Instead, drawing on our vulnerability and 
sense of finitude is a way to circumvent dehumanizing organizational practices. The acceptance 
of vulnerability could help organizational members disrupt organizational tendencies to 
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‘othering’. Vulnerability could influence the conditions through which organizations foster, 
rather than repress, the conditions of what Butler calls a ‘livable life’. As she argues: 
‘my dependency on another, and my dependability, are necessary in order to live and 
to live well. Our shared exposure to precarity is but one ground of our potential 
equality and our reciprocal obligations to produce together conditions of livable life. 
In avowing the need we have for one another, we avow as well basic principles that 
inform the social, democratic conditions of what we might still call ‘the good life’.’ 
(Butler, 2012, p.18; 2015, p.218) 
 
Accepting our vulnerability and that of others, then, is the way to lead a good life in an 
organizational life. This calls for more studies of the aesthetics of existence, and of the practices 
of political life in organizations.  
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